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Summary
Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international 
agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
– this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include 
nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The main parties involved 
in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often 
referred to as “license holders” or “operators” – and the state authority. A license holder 
shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the 
regulatory control to ensure that the license holder does. Additionally, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
To guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials, STUK is obliged to maintain a 
central nuclear materials accountancy system and to verify that nuclear activities in 
Finland are carried out according to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the 
European Union's (EU) legislation and international agreements.
Finland has a significant nuclear power industry. About 99.8 % of the nuclear materials 
(uranium, plutonium) in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. Most of the remaining 0.2 % is at the VTT research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo. 
Additionally, there are a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. The construction 
project for the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel does not involve any actual 
nuclear material yet, but nuclear safeguards are applied to the facility site on the national 
level already, to prepare for effective future safeguards. Proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
technology and nuclear dual use items are less easily mapped and tracked. They must, 
nevertheless, be kept under adequate safeguards.
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to 
demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK 
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remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting 
required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their 
procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did 
they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials 
accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own 
obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards.
Finland, as any state, has the responsibility to take measures to prevent illicit trafficking 
of nuclear and other radioactive materials and sensitive technology, to protect its 
citizens and to fulfil its obligations under international agreements. STUK Nuclear 
Materials Section cooperates closely with the Finnish Customs to offer expert advice in 
development of radiation monitoring at borders, including training for Customs officers. 
One characteristic of the local conditions – our sharing the EU’s north-eastern border 
with the Russian Federation – has motivated also successful cross-border cooperation 
between Finnish and Russian authorities. STUK cooperation programmes in the area of 
non-proliferation emphasise the importance of the regional nuclear security environment 
and of peer-to-peer exchanges between the regulatory authorities. Most of the methods of 
implementing non-proliferation contribute directly also to nuclear security.
STUK has set up an interdivisional Nuclear Security Task Group in order to improve 
internal coordination on this topic and to act as the focal point at STUK for issues dealing 
with nuclear security, counter-terrorism and radiological risk reduction. During 2007 the 
leadership of this task group was assigned to the Nuclear Materials Section.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect 
data received from the International Monitoring System (IMS) and to inform the national 
authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with 
the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the CTBTO verification system has already demonstrated 
its potential for detecting nuclear tests, especially in connection with the nuclear test by 
North Korea (DPRK) in 2006. This event underlined the importance of noble gas (xenon) 
monitoring for the verification system.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear ener-
gy, globally. In order for Finland to have a nuclear 
industry – most of which is constituted by nuclear 
energy production – we must ensure that nucle-
ar materials, equipment and technology are used 
only for their declared, peaceful purposes. This is 
why we have nuclear safeguards: a national sys-
tem for the regulatory control of nuclear materials. 
Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nuclear 
safety and nuclear security and they are applied 
both to big and medium-size nuclear industry and 
to small-scale nuclear material activities. Along 
with the safeguards, the regulatory process for nu-
clear non-proliferation includes transport control, 
export control, border control, international cooper-
ation and conventions, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). The following chapters describe how the 
Finnish nuclear non-proliferation implementation 
works.
1.1 Nuclear safeguards are based 
on international agreements 
and national law
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining the EU, our bilateral agreements with 
Australia, Canada and the USA were partly substi-
tuted by the corresponding Euratom agreements.
Finland was the first state where an 
1 Implementing non-proliferation in 
Finland: why and how does it work?
INFCIRC/153-type nuclear Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 
9 February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 
January 1995), this agreement was suspended and 
subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the 
EU, the Euratom and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) 
entered into force in Finland, on 1 October 1995. 
Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to 
the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 
1998, with the other EU Member States, and rati-
fied it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol 
entered into force in April 30, 2004, when all the 
EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and 
mandate for Euratom nuclear safeguards are de-
fined in the European Commission Regulation No. 
302/2005.
After Finland joined EU as a Member State and 
therefore joined the Euratom nuclear safeguards, 
a comprehensive national safeguards system was 
still maintained. The basic motivation for this is 
the responsibility assumed by Finland for its nu-
clear safeguards and nuclear security under the 
obligations of the NPT.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. As stipulated by the Act, 
STUK issues detailed regulations on safety and 
security (the yVL Guides) that apply to the use of 
nuclear energy. The yVL Guides most relevant to 
nuclear safeguards are:
•	 Control	of	nuclear	fuel	and	other	nuclear	mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide yVL 6.1)
•	 The	national	system	of	accounting	for	and	con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide yVL 6.9)
•	 Reports	 to	 be	 submitted	 on	 nuclear	materials	
(Guide yVL 6.10).
8STUK-B 88
Nuclear materials control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual	use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and data suitable for 
producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
as specified in INFCIRC/254 Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle
•	 nuclear	security,	and
•	 safeguards	 for	 the	 final	 disposal	 of	 spent	 nu-
clear fuel.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system: who 
makes it all happen?
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguarding of its nuclear ma-
terials is on the licence holder. It is the responsibil-
ity of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the licence holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for 
national non-proliferation policy and international 
agreements. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEEC, formerly the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry) is the highest state authority for 
management and control of nuclear energy. MEEC 
is responsible for legislation related to nuclear en-
ergy and it is also the competent safeguards au-
thority mentioned in the Euratom Treaty. Also oth-
er ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Defence contribute to the ef-
ficient functioning of the national nuclear safe-
guards system.
1.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the license 
holders’ activities and ensures that the obligations 
of international agreements concerning peaceful 
use of nuclear materials are met. Regulatory con-
trol by STUK includes the possession, use, produc-
tion, transfer (national and international), han-
dling, storage, transport, export and import of nu-
clear material and nuclear dual use items. STUK 
is in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation 
process for IAEA and European Commission in-
Figure 1. The Nuclear Materials Section and the Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT within the STUK 
organisational structure. Section staff is presented in Appendix 3.
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spectors. STUK approves an inspector as long as 
there are no such issues related to the person in 
question that might adversely affect nuclear safety 
or security at Finnish facilities or the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. The new inspector re-
quests are sent for comments to the operators that 
hold construction or operating licenses for nuclear 
facilities. If STUK cannot approve an inspector, 
it assigns the approval process to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by STUK cover all typical 
measures of a State System of Accounting for and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) and much 
more. STUK reviews the license holders’ reports 
(operational notifications, inventory reports), in-
spects their accountancy, facilities and transport 
arrangements on site and performs system au-
dits. Office work constitutes 90 % of the inspec-
tion effort. STUK runs a verification programme 
for nuclear activities to assess the completeness 
and correctness of the declarations by the licence 
holders. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked with other functions of nuclear 
materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, 
export control, border control, transport control, 
combating illicit trafficking, the physical protection 
of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) – all duties of the STUK Nuclear Materials 
Section. Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear 
security objectives are closely complemented by 
safeguards objectives.
1.2.3 License holders
An essential part of the national nuclear safe-
guards system are the licence holders (in nuclear 
industry often called the operators). They perform 
key functions of the national safeguards system: 
control of the authentic source data of their nucle-
ar materials and nuclear material accountancy at 
the facility level for each of their material balance 
areas (MBA). Each license holders has to operate 
its safeguards system according to its own nuclear 
material handbook. The handbook is part of the fa-
cility’s quality system and reviewed and approved 
by STUK.
Acting on the basis of the basic technical char-
acteristics (BTC) submitted by license holder, the 
Commission shall adopt particular safeguards pro-
visions (PSP). PSP is to be drawn taking account 
of operational and technical constraints, and in 
close consultation with the person or undertaking 
concerned and the relevant member state. Until 
particular safeguards provisions is adopted, the 
person or undertaking shall apply the general pro-
visions of the Commission regulation No 302/2005.
99.8 % of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The nuclear 
material (uranium, plutonium) amounts in Finland 
in 1990–2007 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 2. Uranium amount in Finland in 1990–2007.
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Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types, nuclear 
among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
heat is located in Loviisa on the south-east coast 
of Finland. This first NPP to have been built in 
Finland hosts two power reactor units: Loviisa 
1 and Loviisa 2. Loviisa 1 started its electricity 
production in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 1980. The two 
units share a common fresh and spent fuel storage 
and for nuclear safeguards accountancy purposes 
the whole NPP is counted as one material balance 
area (MBA code WL0V). The electricity generated 
by the Loviisa NPP constitutes ca. 10 % of the 
whole electricity production in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation. Recently, also Fortum has purchased 
fuel from Spain, using a similar strategy as TVO 
(below), however, this is not expected to continue in 
the near future. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP 
was returned back to the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation until 1996, and since then it has been 
stored in the interim storage due to a change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation, which forbids, in gen-
eral, import and export of nuclear waste.
Particular Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa 
NPP that define the European Commission’s nucle-
ar safeguards procedures for the facility have been 
in force since 1998.
The Loviisa NPP site, as per the requirements 
of the Additional Protocol, comprises the entire 
hästholmen island and extends to the main gate 
on the continent.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and operates 
a nuclear power plant in Olkiluoto, in Eurajoki on 
the west coast of Finland. The Olkiluoto NPP con-
sists of two nuclear power reactor units, Olkiluoto 
1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an interim spent fuel stor-
age. Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the electricity 
grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. The Olkiluoto 
NPP contributes ca. 16 % of the whole electricity 
production in Finland. At the Olkiluoto NPP there 
are three active material balance areas (MBA codes 
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in the TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian ori-
gin. Uranium is enriched in the Russian Federation 
or in the EU and the fuel assemblies are manufac-
tured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures for preventing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is underway. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has 
provided the Embassy of Japan with the Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) assurances on the fuel 
channels to be shipped from Japan to Finland by 
31 December 2010. The European Commission has 
assigned the MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3.
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Figure 3. Plutonium amount in Finland in 1990–2007.
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The TVO NPP site, as per the requirements of 
the Additional Protocol, comprises the fenced areas 
around the reactor units, the spent fuel storage and 
the storage for low and intermediate level waste as 
well as the Olkiluoto 3 construction site.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
other facilities than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research re-
actor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. 
The research reactor was the first nuclear reactor 
built in Finland. It reached criticality on 27 March 
1962.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998.
The VTT FiR site, as per the requirements of 
the Additional Protocol, consists of the whole build-
ing around the research reactor.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored in 
STUK, mainly material no longer in use and hence 
taken into STUK’s custody. The Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority was founded in 1958 and 
is located in its current premises in Roihupelto, 
helsinki, since 1994. The STUK MBA (WFRS) con-
sists of the STUK headquarters and the “central 
interim storage for small-user radioactive waste” 
at the Olkiluoto NPP site.
The STUK site, as per the requirements of 
the Additional Protocol, consists of STUK’s head-
quarters (non-STUK premises in the building are 
excluded).
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of helsinki (hyRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. hyRL is located in Kumpula, helsinki.
The hyRL site, as per the requirements of the 
Additional Protocol, comprises the whole building 
that hosts the laboratory.
OMG Kokkola Chemicals (MBA WKK0)
The OMG Kokkola Chemicals facility is not using 
nuclear materials as such: the by-products of their 
cobalt purification process contain uranium, qual-
ifying them as nuclear material. OMG Kokkola 
Chemicals has an operation license for storing and 
handling and shipping this nuclear material to 
Comurhex in France. OMG Kokkola Chemicals is 
located on the west coast of Finland.
Minor nuclear material holders
There are about 10 minor nuclear material holders 
in Finland. One of them is an actual material bal-
ance area: University of Jyväskylä, Department of 
Physics (JyFL, MBA code WDPJ), but in fact the 
nuclear material in JyFL has been derogated and 
exempted by the European Commission and the 
IAEA. Other minor nuclear material holders are 
members of a Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for purposes 
of international nuclear safeguards. CAM members 
are listed in Table 4 (Appendix 1).
Posiva
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It 
is owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been 
excavating an underground rock characterisation 
facility called “Onkalo”, in Eurajoki, Finland, since 
2004, and thus preparing for the construction of 
the final disposal facility. While not yet a nucle-
ar material holder, Onkalo is highly relevant to 
the national safeguards system, as is explained in 
chapter 2.1.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom safeguards 
in Finland: enabled by the 
state, checking on the state
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to op-
erate in Finland. These two international inspector-
ates have agreed on cooperation (New Partnership 
Approach, NPA), which aims to reduce undue du-
plication of effort. In Finland this has thus far not 
decreased the number of inspection days and there 
is overlap in the Commission’s and the IAEA’s safe-
guards activities. In 2007 the IAEA safeguards ac-
tivities were carried out without significant changes 
to the previous years. Discussions in a construc-
tive atmosphere are ongoing between the IAEA, the 
Commission and the EU Member States to enhance 
cooperation and find the synergies that would im-
prove the efficiency of the three levels of nuclear 
safeguards in place in the EU. Finland endeavours 
to participate actively in this process.
12
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Facility attachments (FA) according to the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) were not 
in force in Finland in 2007. While not appreciated, 
this state of affairs is being tolerated, and it has not 
influenced negatively the implementation of inter-
national safeguards. The drafting of a “Safeguards 
Agreement for the Finnish geological repository” 
was initiated with the IAEA in 2004. Consequently, 
a meeting between the IAEA, Posiva and STUK 
was organised at the IAEA in September 2005 to 
establish formal safeguards between Finland and 
the IAEA already in the pre-nuclear phase of the 
repository. Unfortunately, such an arrangement is 
not yet in place.
1.4 Declarations provide the basis 
for state evaluation by the IAEA
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol.
In Finland, the state has delegated its respon-
sibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
collects, inspects and reviews the relevant informa-
tion and then submits the compiled declarations 
to the IAEA. STUK has been nominated a site 
representative, as per European Commission regu-
lation No 302/2005. STUK also reviews the decla-
rations about Finland that are submitted by the 
Commission. All declarations submitted by STUK 
are copied to the IAEA and the Commission.
In Finland, there are five sites in the sense of 
the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear power 
plant (NPP) sites: the Olkiluoto NPP and the 
Loviisa NPP, and the three minor sites: VTT, 
STUK and the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at 
the University of helsinki. STUK reviews and 
verifies the correctness and completeness of the 
information about the sites provided by the license 
holders. In order to confirm the comprehensiveness 
of the site maps they are, in some cases, compared 
with optical satellite imagery and recently also 
with radar imagery.
STUK reviews annually the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials listed in Annex II of the 
Additional Protocol.
1.5 Non-destructive assay and 
environmental sampling 
complement nuclear accountancy
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a state 
nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nuclear 
materials and activities within the state are in ac-
Important events related to the 
Additional Protocol and Finland
•	 IAEA	 Board	 of	 Governors	 approves	 a	 model	
protocol 1997
•	 EU	Member	States	sign	the	Additional	Proto-
col	22	September	1998
•	 Finland	ratifies	the	Additional	Protocol	8	Au-
gust 2000
•	 Additional	Protocol	enters	into	force	in	the	EU	
30 april 2004
•	 Finland	(STUK)	submits	initial	declarations	8	
July 2004
•	 European	Commission	submits	initial	declara-
tions	about	Finland	22	September	2004
•	 First	Complementary	Access	(24	h),	at	the	Lab-
oratory of radiochemistry at the university of 
Helsinki	site	21	December	2004
•	 Annual	declaration	updates	4	May	2005	(Fin-
land)	and	13	May	2005	(Commission)
•	 First	 set	 of	 2c	 questions	 from	 IAEA	 15	 July	
2005
•	 STUK’s	answers	to	the	first	2c	questions	8	Sep-
tember	2005	(Finland)
•	 Commission’s	answers	to	the	first	2c	questions	
13	December	2005	(Commission)	and	24	Janu-
ary 2006 (Commission + Finland)
•	 Complementary	Access	 (2	h),	at	 the	Olkiluoto	
site	13	September	2005
•	 Complementary	Access	(24	h),	at	the	STUK	site	
7	December	2005
•	 Annual	declaration	updates	10	May	2006	(Fin-
land) and 12 may 2006 (Commission)
•	 Complementary	Access	(2	h),	at	the	Loviisa	site	
17	November	2006
•	 2a(ix)(a)	declarations	submitted	quarterly
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cordance with the licence holders’ declarations and 
that there are no undeclared activities. Such meth-
ods can provide information on the identity of the 
nuclear materials and confirm that licence holders’ 
declarations are correct and complete with respect 
to e.g. the enrichment of uranium, the burnup, and 
the cooling time of nuclear fuel. The technical anal-
ysis methods in use at STUK are non-destructive 
assay (NDA) and environmental sampling (ES).
STUK employs three methods for NDA. All of 
them are suitable for verifying spent nuclear fuel. 
One method lends itself for rapid scanning, as the 
detector is mounted on the fuel transfer machine 
and the fuel elements can be measured from above 
the fuel pond without moving the elements. The 
other two methods, on the other hand, allow con-
firming with greater confidence the correctness of 
the declared burnup and the cooling time. With the 
most precise method, the absence of a fuel pin or 
pins from a fuel element can be discovered.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards 
environmental samples are used to investigate 
these traces, which provide further clarity in es-
tablishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes.
1.6 Export/import control and 
licensing are also elements of 
nuclear materials control
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act also 
other items than nuclear materials are under regu-
latory control. A license is required for possession, 
transfer, export and import of components, equip-
ment, materials and technology suitable for produc-
ing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons (nuclear dual 
use items). The list of these other items is based 
on Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Guidelines 
(INFCIRC/254 Part 1). The license holder is required 
to provide STUK annually with a list of the above 
mentioned items. In addition, export, import and 
transfer of such items shall be reported to STUK.
Mining and enrichment operations that aim 
to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. A company or a person carrying out these 
activities shall have a license and an accounting 
system to keep track of the amounts of uranium 
and thorium. A license is also required to export 
and import uranium or thorium ore or ore con-
centrates and these activities shall be reported to 
STUK and to the European Commission.
Finland’s export control system is based on 
Regulation No 1334/2000 of the Council of the 
European Union (EC). This regulation sets up 
a Community regime for the control of export of 
dual use items and technology. Export of Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Part 1 items are regu-
lated by the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and of 
Part 2 items by the Finnish Act on the Control of 
Exports of Dual Use Goods. The authority in the 
first case is STUK or the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (formerly the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry) and in the latter case the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. In both cases an authorization 
is required to export nuclear items outside the 
European Union. A license is also required for EU 
internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items excluding 
non-sensitive nuclear materials.
1.7 Regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear and other 
radioactive materials
Requirements for the transport of radioactive ma-
terial are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements are 
based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations for 
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, TS-R-1, 
and their purpose is to protect people, environment 
and property from the harmful effects of radiation 
during the transport of radioactive material. Based 
on these regulations on the transport of dangerous 
goods, STUK is the competent national authority 
for the regulatory control regarding the transport 
of radioactive material.
Transporting radioactive material is regarded 
as use of radiation but no separate licence for 
transport is required in Finland of the consignor or 
of the carrier. however, the consignor shall have a 
safety licence for the possession or handling of ra-
dioactive material. The consignments of radioactive 
material may be carried out either by transport 
companies that are specialised in dangerous goods 
or by the consignor themselves, in cases where 
the consignor is competent. Competence may be 
obtained by acquiring the driver’s licence for trans-
port of dangerous goods (the ADR licence).
The consignor has the main responsibility for 
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the safety of the transport, whereas other actors 
involved in the transport, such as the carrier and 
the consignee, are responsible for their specific 
parts of the transport. According to the Finnish 
Radiation Act, the safety licensee acting as the con-
signor shall assure that both the package and the 
mode of transport fulfil the safety requirements 
and that the carrier has all the information and 
instructions necessary for safe transport. STUK 
guidelines further obligate the safety licensee to 
manage the security of the materials. In some 
specific cases where the requirements cannot be 
completely met, STUK may grant an approval for 
a transport with special arrangements, based on 
an application. When granting such an approval 
STUK must, however, be able to confirm that the 
appropriate safety level is achieved.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material: a licence granted by STUK is needed for 
it. Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a security plan approved by STUK are 
mandatory for each transport of nuclear material. 
A certificate of nuclear liability insurance shall 
also be delivered to STUK before the transport. 
Furthermore, a package may be used for the trans-
port of fissile nuclear material only after the pack-
age design has been approved by STUK.
1.8 STUK contributes intensively 
to international safeguards 
development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by nature, an inter-
national domain. This is seen in our daily work 
and, hopefully, throughout the chapters of this re-
port. here are some specific international nuclear 
safeguards related cooperation and development 
efforts that STUK participates in:
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and the Vice-Presidency of ESARDA is currently 
held by STUK’s representative.
STUK’s expert participates in the work of the 
Atomic Questions Group (AQG) of the Council 
of the European Union and contributes to the 
Safeguards Experts meetings.
The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation (SAGSI) comprises a group of nu-
clear safeguards experts from the IAEA Member 
States, appointed by the IAEA Director General 
to advise on safeguards implementation issues. 
One of the experts in this group is a STUK staff 
member.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts have 
contributed to the IAEA’s international evaluation 
missions, such as the International SSAC Advisory 
Service (ISSAS). The ISSAS mission reviews State 
Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SSAC) and provides suggestions for im-
proving them.
1.9 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty: a global technology-
based non-proliferation tool
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test ex-
plosions in any environment. This ban is aimed 
at constraining the development and qualitative 
Some central international and 
Finnish regulations on the transport 
of dangerous goods by road
•	 IAEA	 Safety	 Standard,	 Regulations	 for	 the	
Safe Transport of radioactive material, Safety 
Requirements	No.	TS-R-1
•	 European	Agreement	Concerning	the	Interna-
tional	Carriage	of	Dangerous	Goods	by	Road	
(aDr)
•	 Finnish	 Act	 on	 the	 Transport	 of	 Dangerous	
Goods	(719/1994)
•	 Finnish	 Decree	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 on	
the	 Transport	 of	 Dangerous	 Goods	 by	 Road	
(194/2002)
•	 Finnish	 Decree	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Transport	
and Communications on the Transport of Dan-
gerous	Goods	by	Road	(277/2002)
•	 Finnish	Decree	 on	 the	 Safety	Adviser	 for	 the	
Transport	 of	 Dangerous	 Goods	 by	 Road	 and	
Rail	(274/2002)
•	 Finnish	 Decree	 on	 a	 Driving	 Certificate	 of	
Drivers of Vehicles carrying Dangerous goods 
(1112/1998).
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improvement of nuclear weapons, including also 
the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New york on 24 September 1996. The CTBT 
will enter into force after it has been ratified by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or re-
search reactors.
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. The 
verification regime consists of the following ele-
ments: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site in-
spections and confidence-building measures.
Finland has signed and ratified the CTBT. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the CTBT of not to carry out any nuclear weap-
ons tests, Finland takes part in the development of 
the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the national author-
ity is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK has 
two roles: STUK operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The 
main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received 
from the IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the IMS 
by providing support in the radionuclide analyses 
and in the quality control of the radionuclide sta-
tion network. The third major national collaborator 
is the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
helsinki, which runs a seismology station (PS17 in 
Lahti), which is included in the IMS, and provides 
analysis of waveform IMS data.
1.10 Nuclear security shares many 
of its objectives and methods 
with nuclear safeguards
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. Within STUK’s organisation, a few 
of its nuclear security related tasks fall – solely or 
partly – under the duties of the nuclear non-prolif-
eration process and the Nuclear Materials Section. 
In other words, the majority of the activities that 
aim at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nu-
clear materials and sensitive nuclear technology 
contribute also to nuclear security (see the defini-
tion of nuclear security in the infobox). In the list 
below these nuclear security related activities are 
grouped into categories according to the defence in 
depth concept commonly used in the nuclear secu-
rity terminology:
Prevention
•	 nuclear	 non-proliferation:	 a	 national	 system	
for the control of nuclear materials and nuclear 
dual use items
•	 facilitating	international	nuclear	safeguards	ac-
tivities in Finland
•	 regulatory	 control	 of	 the	 transport	 of	 nuclear	
and other radioactive materials
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) Status (31.12.2007)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 177
•	 Total	Ratifications	 141
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 34
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
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•	measures	due	to	abnormal	detections	abroad	of	
nuclear or other radioactive materials
•	 export	 control:	 expert	 support	 to	 the	Ministry	
for Foreign Affairs
•	 cooperation	with	 other	 national	 authorities	 in	
prevention of illegal activities related to nuclear 
or other radioactive materials: threat assess-
ment, self-assessment, improvement, informa-
tion sharing, training, exercises
•	 national	 expert	 contact	 point	 for	 internation-
al conventions, resolutions and agreements 
against proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
sensitive technology (UNSC Resolution 1540, 
Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terror-
ism (GICNT), etc.) in support of the competent 
ministry
•	 participation	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 international	
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security com-
munities and working groups (IAEA, ESARDA, 
AQG, ITWG)
Definition of nuclear security: The prevention 
and	 detection	 of	 and	 response	 to	 theft,	 sabotage,	
unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other mali-
cious acts involving nuclear material, other ra-
dioactive	 substances	 or	 their	 associated	 facilities	
(working	definition	 established	by	 the	fifth	meet-
ing	 of	 the	 Advisory	 Group	 on	 Nuclear	 Security	
1–5	December	2005)	[IAEA	Nuclear	Security	Plan	
2006–2009].
•	 operation	of	the	Finnish	National	Data	Centre	
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Trea-
ty
•	 expert	advice	to	the	Finnish	Customs	on	radia-
tion monitoring at borders, for concept develop-
ment and technical specifications of monitoring 
equipment and data transfer; training for Cus-
toms officers.
Detection
•	 national	system	for	control	of	nuclear	materials	
and nuclear dual use items: non-destructive as-
say and environmental sampling, other inspec-
tions.
Response
•	 participation	 in	 STUK’s	 response	 in	 cases	 of	
radiological or nuclear incidents, e.g:
•	 expert	 advice	 to	 the	 Finnish	 Customs	 on	 in-
terpretation of radiation detections at borders, 
more sophisticated on-site measurements and 
analyses in response to border monitoring 
alarms.
A division between safety, security and safeguards 
need often not be emphasised in our daily work, 
as they are all intertwined and all necessary for 
accomplishing STUK’s mission: protecting the peo-
ple, society and environment from the harmful ef-
fects of radiation.
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2 Themes of the year 2007
2.1 Onkalo: Nuclear safeguards 
today pave the way for receiving 
nuclear materials into the 
future final disposal facility
In order to prepare for the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel, an underground rock characterisation 
facility (Onkalo) is under construction in Eurajoki, 
Finland, since 2004. As Onkalo is expected to be-
come a part of the future final disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel, STUK has decided – as early 
as in 2003 – to start applying safeguards to it. 
Subsequently, the company Posiva Oy, which is in 
charge of the whole final disposal project, was re-
quired to implement nuclear safeguards from the 
beginning of the Onkalo excavation and extending 
to the future closure of the final disposal site. This 
marked the start of safeguards activities for final 
disposal in Finland. These activities have at least 
four objectives:
(i) to ensure that all necessary information about 
the final disposal facility will be available in 
due time;
(ii) to be able to confirm that there are no unde-
clared activities relevant to nuclear non-pro-
liferation at or around the final disposal site;
(iii) to enable the IAEA to perform integrated nu-
clear safeguards activities in Finland in a cost 
efficient way;
(iv) to enable the IAEA and the European Com-
mission to plan for their future safeguards 
activities.
The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in an un-
derground facility challenges the planning and im-
plementation of safeguards with an unprecedented 
scenario: the nuclear material cannot be re-verified 
once it has been encapsulated and emplaced. This 
and other questions are put to the group of ex-
perts for Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories (ASTOR) by the IAEA, which has the 
group at its disposal to support in the develop-
ment of international safeguards for final disposal. 
Finland, naturally, has a vested interest in this 
development and in ASTOR.
Important dates (past and planned) 
relevant to nuclear safeguards 
in the schedule for the final 
disposal project in Finland
1999 Posiva applies for a decision in principle
2001 Decision in principle enters into force
2003 Civil construction permit is granted for 
Posiva
2003	STUK	sends	basic	 information	on	the	plan	
for	the	final	disposal	facility	to	the	IAEA	and	the	
european Commission, national safeguards for 
final	disposal	begin
2004	 Posiva	 starts	 to	 excavate	 the	 underground	
rock	characterisation	facility	(Onkalo)
(tbd)	Relevant	information	on	the	disposal	facility	
due	to	be	sent	to	the	Commission	
2008 Commission assigns the mBa code W0lF to 
the	future	final	disposal	facility
2012 Posiva to apply for a nuclear construction 
license	 for	 the	 final	 disposal	 facility	 (tbd)	 Basic	
technical characteristics (BTC) on the disposal 
facility	due	to	be	sent	to	the	Commission	*
2018 Posiva to apply for the operating license
2020	Final	disposal	to	begin
* as per article 4 of the Commission regulation 
(Euratom)	 No	 302/2005,	 relevant	 information	
about	the	facility	is	due	200	days	prior	to	the	start	
of	construction	and	about	basic	technical	charac-
teristics	 200	days	 prior	 to	 the	 receipt	 of	 the	 first	
batch	of	nuclear	material.
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Today’s safeguards activities by STUK consist 
of auditing Posiva’s nuclear safeguards system, re-
viewing Posiva’s reports and confirming by on-site 
inspections that the Onkalo underground space 
corresponds to Posiva’s as-built documentation.
In June 2007 Posiva hosted a visit for repre-
sentatives of the IAEA, the European Commission, 
the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and 
the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry (now 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy), ac-
companied by STUK. This included, in connection 
with one of STUK’s regular on-site inspections, a 
trip down into Onkalo (at approximately –200 m at 
the time) where also the visitors could compare the 
tunnel and shafts against the most recent as-built 
information.
2.2 External and internal audits aim 
for continuous improvement
STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section was audited by 
a fellow state authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power 
Inspectorate (SKI) in January 2007. The audit team 
from SKI consisted of Mr. Göran Dahlin, who is 
the head of the Section of Safeguards and Export 
Control and Ms. Martina Dufva, who is responsi-
ble for nuclear material accountancy and inspection 
planning. The audit took one day and concluded 
that STUK had developed a very good system of ac-
countancy and control of nuclear material, through 
guides for the licence holders as well as internal 
guides. having said that, the auditors gave recom-
mendations for improvement and had a range of 
findings both of good practices and needed improve-
ments. All these recommendations have been col-
lected in an action plan by the head of the STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section and are either completed, 
under way, planned or under consideration. The au-
dit and its findings were found most useful.
In 2007 the Nuclear Materials Section started 
its own internal audit process for purposes of con-
tinuous self-guided development. The audit process 
aims to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the national nuclear materials regulatory control 
system by reviewing selected elements of it each 
year. The assessment of effectiveness was started 
by setting up a 10-point list of tasks that the sys-
tem must perform in order to allow for cost-effi-
cient international nuclear safeguards in Finland 
and to provide the international inspectorates with 
the products they need from a state nuclear safe-
guards system. The two first points on the list were 
assessed. Assessment of efficiency was started by 
looking at STUK’s own nuclear materials control 
system, as a nuclear material holder. The first 
internal audit reported to the head of the Nuclear 
Materials Section who commented on its findings 
and endorsed the implementation of its recom-
mendations. While the major issues seem to be in 
good order, several recommendations for practical 
improvements were made and prioritised. The 
two most important recommendations have been 
passed on to STUK directors and the next two are 
underway. A schedule for implementing the rest of 
the recommendations will be prepared in 2008.
2.3 20 years of supporting IAEA
A Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards (FINSP) was established in 1988 and it 
is funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This 
programme has been one element of Finland’s con-
sistent commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. 
It has been the understanding in Finland that the 
IAEA	appreciates	R&D	and	training	support	from	
the IAEA Member States, as such support ena-
bles the IAEA to accomplish its tasks effectively 
and efficiently. The FINSP budget for 2007 was 
190 000 euros. In the past years the strongest are-
as of FINSP activity have been safeguards training 
and the development of new verification methods. 
The FINSP also has a light administration struc-
ture and a network of experts at its disposal, which 
enables flexibility and fast response.
A valuable lesson learned to date is the impor-
tance of understanding IAEA’s needs. In an ideal 
situation the IAEA clearly identifies how it best 
benefits from the tasks, experience and expertise 
of FINSP. Several cases have shown that the suc-
cessful implementation of FINSP depends on a 
common understanding based on in-depth identifi-
cation of IAEA’s needs.
The FINSP is one important cooperation chan-
nel between Finland and the IAEA. Contacts with 
the IAEA through the programme have benefited 
the practical implementation of INFCIRC/153, 193 
and 540 type agreements.
In the future the FINSP continues to concen-
trate on its traditionally strong areas of activ-
ity: development of new verification methods and 
inspection tools together with supporting IAEA 
inspectors’ training.
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3 Activities in 2007
3.1 Regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
3.1.1 Declarations, complementary 
accesses and approvals of new 
international inspectors
All the relevant license holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time, by 1 March 2007.
STUK submitted annual declaration updates 
to the IAEA on 14 May 2007 and the European 
Commission submitted its declaration updates 2 
May 2007.
IAEA carried out a complementary access (with 
a 24-h advance notification) for the exempted nucle-
ar material at University of Jyväskylä, Department 
of Physics on 6 June 2007. The Commission partici-
pated in this access. Furthermore, the IAEA carried 
out a complementary access at Metso Materials 
Technology in Tampere on 27 September 2007, in 
accordance with article 8 of the Additional Protocol, 
where the state invites the IAEA to the access.
In 2007, altogether 28 IAEA and 9 Commission 
new inspectors were approved to perform inspec-
tions at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa NPP
In 2007, STUK granted Fortum three licenses: one 
for the transport of nuclear fuel, one for the im-
port of equipment and one for the import of au-
tomation technology information. STUK accepted 
Loviisa NPP’s updated nuclear material handbook 
in February and approved in June the new person 
to be appointed responsible for nuclear safeguards 
at the Loviisa NPP.
Based on previously granted import licences, 
219 fuel assemblies containing 26.9 tons of ura-
nium were imported to the Loviisa NPP: 111 fuel 
assemblies from Spain and 108 from the Russian 
Federation. The receipts of fuel assemblies are in-
cluded in Table 1, and the total amounts of nuclear 
materials at the Loviisa NPP are presented in 
Table 2 and Table 3 (Appendix 1).
The refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Loviisa 1 took place in the period 18.8.–7.9.2007 
and that of Loviisa 2 in the period 8.–23.9.2007. 
For both units 102 fresh fuel assemblies were 
loaded into the core. In the Loviisa 2 unit, 6 spent 
fuel assemblies were replaced with assemblies 
that were already irradiated in previous cycles. 
Before the closing of each reactor, STUK, the 
IAEA and the European Commission identified 
the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and veri-
fied/item counted the loading ponds. The Loviisa 
1 core was inspected on 26 August 2007 and the 
Loviisa 2 core on 15 September 2007, in con-
nection with the physical inventory verification 
(PIV). In addition to the PIV and the core controls, 
four routine inspections were carried out with 
the IAEA and the Commission in March, May, 
August and November. The post-PIV inspection 
took place in September. In addition to inspec-
tions performed together with the IAEA and the 
Commission, STUK identified the fuel followers to 
be loaded into the reactor in August.
At the Loviisa NPP STUK performed two NDA 
verification measurement campaigns on spent fuel 
elements in 2007. The first campaign, 12–13 April, 
was carried out by upgraded SFAT equipment with 
a CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer. Traditionally, a 
SFAT device is equipped with a lower resolution 
NaI detector. Altogether 235 fuel elements were 
verified. The second campaign, 8–9 November, was 
carried out with FORK equipment on 18 spent 
fuel elements. FORK equipment delivers a gross 
gamma signal from an ionisation chamber and a 
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neutron count rate from a fission chamber. STUK’s 
FORK equipment is sometimes referred to as 
eFORK (enhanced FORK), because it incorporates 
a CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer. The measurements 
at the Loviisa NPP did not indicate any inconsist-
encies in the reporting by the operator.
In 2007 STUK collected one environmental 
sample at the Loviisa NPP.
On the basis of its assessment as well as IAEA 
and Commission inspection results, STUK conclud-
ed that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP has complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2007.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto NPP
For the Olkiluoto NPP the Particular Safeguards 
Provisions that define the European Commission’s 
nuclear safeguards procedures for the facility en-
tered into force in the summer of 2007.
In 2007, STUK granted to TVO 6 import licenc-
es for fresh nuclear fuel for the period from 2007 to 
2008. In total, 232 fuel assemblies containing 40.2 
tons of uranium were imported to the Olkiluoto 
NPP in 2007, 114 from Spain and 118 from Sweden. 
123 spent fuel assemblies were transferred from 
both the Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 units to the 
Olkiluoto spent fuel storage. The receipts and ship-
ments of fuel assemblies are included in Table 1, 
and the total amounts of nuclear materials at the 
Olkiluoto NPP are presented in Table 2 and Table 
3 (Appendix 1).
The refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 1 took place in the period 6.–15.5.2007 
and that of Olkiluoto 2 in the period 20.5.–6.6.2007. 
At the Olkiluoto 1 unit, 128 fresh fuel assemblies 
and at the Olkiluoto 2 unit, 120 fresh fuel assem-
blies were loaded into the core. Before the reactors 
were closed STUK, the IAEA and the European 
Commission identified the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and verified/item counted the load-
ing ponds. Olkiluoto 1 was inspected on 12 May 
2007 and Olkiluoto 2 on 30 May 2007. STUK, the 
IAEA and the Commission verified the physical 
inventory in the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage on 12 
November 2007. 4 routine inspections were per-
formed by STUK, the IAEA and the Commission, 
an inspection for each MBA at the Olkiluoto NPP: 
in March, June, September and November.
At the Olkiluoto NPP STUK performed three 
NDA verification measurement campaigns on 
spent fuel elements in 2007.
The first campaign, 3–5 April, was carried out 
at the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage with upgraded 
SFAT equipment with a CdZnTe-gamma spectrom-
eter. Traditionally, the SFAT device is equipped 
with a low resolution NaI detector. During the pre-
vious campaign in November 2006 the SFAT was 
found to be defective and the campaign had to be 
suspended. The device was repaired and serviced 
at STUK during the first quarter of 2007 and the 
detector was upgraded from a 3" × 3" NaI crystal 
to 1500 mm³ CdZnTe-semiconductor with far su-
perior resolution. The upgrade was successful, the 
detection capability was greatly enhanced and 
measurement times required to collect statistically 
significant fission product signals were notably 
shortened. During the campaign 71 elements were 
verified. The elements were selected from all types 
of assemblies present at the spent fuel storage. The 
equipment could be used in verification of all types 
of fuel, which is a significant improvement from 
the earlier setup with the NaI-detector.
During the second campaign, 19–21 June, STUK 
performed Gamma Burnup Verification (GBUV) 
measurements at the Olkiluoto 1 reactor hall. 
Altogether 30 spent fuel assemblies and 2 hermetic 
bottles were verified. One of the hermetic bottles 
was confirmed to be empty as declared by the op-
erator. This campaign was observed by an inspec-
tor from the IAEA. The campaign was unique as 
this was the first time when GBUV measurements 
were made at the Olkiluoto 1 reactor hall. Also 
the detector was new: an electrically cooled hPGe-
detector with accompanying electronics. Some of 
the assemblies had only been cooled for 3 weeks; 
hence it was also possible to detect many short-
lived fission products, such as La-140 and I-131.
During the third campaign, 8–9 November, 
STUK carried out measurements at the Olkiluoto 
spent fuel storage with upgraded SFAT equipment 
with a CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer. Altogether 
126 spent fuel elements were verified. The meas-
urement campaigns at the Olkiluoto NPP did not 
indicate any inconsistencies in the reporting by the 
operator.
In 2007 STUK collected one environmental 
sample at the Olkiluoto NPP.
On the basis of its assessment as well as IAEA 
and Commission inspection results, STUK conclud-
ed that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP has complied with its 
nuclear safeguards obligations in 2007.
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3.1.4 The VTT FiR1 research reactor
In 2007, STUK approved VTT FiR1 research reac-
tor’s updated nuclear material handbook.
STUK, IAEA and European Commission safe-
guards inspectors verified the nuclear material 
inventory of VTT on 11 June 2007. The nuclear 
material inventory was concluded to be correct. 
STUK made a few remarks on imperfections in 
the nuclear material reporting. In its follow-up 
inspections on 25 June 2007 STUK concluded that 
the required corrective actions had been accept-
ably taken and the remarks were closed. The IAEA 
or the Commission did not have any clarification 
requests on their inspection. The inventory of nu-
clear materials at the FiR1 research reactor in the 
end of 2007 is presented in Table 3 (Appendix 1).
On the basis of its verification and assessment, 
STUK has concluded that the VTT FiR1 research 
reactor had complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2007.
3.1.5 Minor nuclear material holders
STUK, the IAEA and Euratom carried out a physi-
cal inventory verification (PIV) inspection at the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of helsinki on 16 October 2007 and at STUK on 
17 October 2007. A nuclear safeguards inspection 
by all three inspectorates took place also at OMG 
Kokkola Chemicals, on 28 September 2007.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK has con-
cluded that the minor nuclear material holders 
have complied with their nuclear safeguards obli-
gations in 2007.
3.1.6 Nuclear dual use items, export/
import control and licenses
In 2007 STUK issued seven licences for importing 
and one licence for exporting nuclear equipment, 
and two licences for exporting nuclear technology. 
STUK reviewed three inventory listings on nuclear 
dual use items. In 2007 there were no licence ap-
plications for uranium or thorium ore or ore con-
centrates.
In 2007 an amendment to the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree was drafted by STUK 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (now the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy). One 
key issue was to update the regulations concerning 
export control of nuclear items. The amendment 
draft proposed that export licensing of nuclear ma-
terials and nuclear dual use items be transferred to 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The amendment of 
the act was accepted by the Government and was 
forwarded to the Parliament for final approval. The 
degree will be amended later in 2008.
3.1.7 The final disposal facility
In order to confirm that the excavated underground 
space corresponds to documentation, STUK carried 
out three regular on-site inspections and one extra 
demonstration inspection at Onkalo in 2007. The 
demonstration inspection was arranged in connec-
tion with an IAEA–European Commission techni-
cal visit to Posiva and Onkalo in May 2007. The 
purpose of the visit was to familiarise the inter-
national inspectorates with Posiva’s and STUK’s 
non-proliferation activities for Onkalo and for their 
approaches to the future safeguards for final dis-
posal. All parties considered the visit very use-
ful. The IAEA and the Commission participated as 
Figure 5. STUK demonstrates the inspection to IAEA 
and European Commission in Onkalo in May 2007.
Figure 6. Laser scanning in Onkalo.
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observers also in regular on-site inspections, the 
Commission in June and the IAEA both in June 
and in November.
STUK and Posiva arranged for the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) an op-
portunity to document the Onkalo underground 
space by digital laser scanning. The result was 
compared with Posiva’s own laser scanning results, 
which they use routinely to document the exca-
vated tunnel as it is built (hence the term as-built 
information). Consequently, STUK got an inde-
pendent verification of the underground space at 
the time and of the validity of Posiva’s method.
STUK audited Posiva’s nuclear safeguards sys-
tem in 2007. This was done mainly by document-
ing the observations made throughout the year in 
connection with report reviews and on-site inspec-
tions. As a result of the audit STUK requested 
that Posiva update its procedures in its non-pro-
liferation handbook. The update is partly due to 
developing methods at Posiva and partly intended 
to clarify the descriptions of some of Posiva’s prac-
tices. Overall, Posiva’s safeguards system is well fit 
for purpose.
STUK provided to the IAEA and to the 
Commission its annual report on its safeguards ac-
tivities related to Onkalo and final disposal on 23 
April 2007. STUK also declared the Onkalo project 
within article 2a(x) of the Additional Protocol to 
the Safeguards Agreement.
3.1.8 Transport of nuclear and other 
radioactive materials
In 2007, STUK performed four inspections of the 
transports arrangements of the nuclear safety li-
censees. It was evident that not all licensees were 
fully aware of the regulations on the transport of 
Figure 7. Labelling, placarding and radiation measurements are checked in a transport inspection.
dangerous goods. Therefore STUK required sev-
eral clarifications, where the safety licensee had 
to present additional documentation focusing on 
the safety of the licensee’s transport procedures. 
One application for transport with special arrange-
ments was delivered to STUK. The application was 
later withdrawn, as the transport turned out not 
to be necessary. STUK received one testing plan 
where the aim was to demonstrate the safety of a 
package to be used in the transport of a liquid ra-
dioactive material. The plan could not be approved 
as such and the end result of the process was that 
the package is not in use.
In 2007, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to 
Finland from Spain, Sweden and the Russian 
Federation. In relation to these imports, STUK 
granted one new transport licence and approved 
four transport plans. STUK inspected one transport 
of fresh nuclear fuel that was imported to Finland 
from the Russian Federation. The inspection cov-
ered the transport activities from the Finnish side 
of the border to the power plant. Furthermore, 
STUK approved three package designs for pack-
ages to be used in the transport of fissile material.
3.1.9 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2007, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. STUK carried out an on-site inspection 
where TVO’s nuclear material accountancy on the 
fresh fuel imported in 2007 was verified against 
the original shipment documents covering the in-
ternational transfers. Based on the findings, STUK 
concluded that TVO has complied with its safe-
guards obligations in purchasing the nuclear fuel 
and managing its international transfers.
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Most fuel assemblies used at Fortum’s facilities 
are purchased in and imported from the Russian 
Federation: the uranium is of Russian origin and 
all phases of the uranium processing and of the fuel 
manufacturing take place in the Russian Federation. 
In 2007, fuel assemblies containing uranium of not 
only Russian but also Kazakh origin were deliv-
ered to the Loviisa nuclear power plant (NPP). The 
Loviisa NPP has reported that it has no immediate 
plans to continue international transfers.
3.2 Preparing for the IAEA’s integrated 
nuclear safeguards in Finland
In a bilateral IAEA–STUK nuclear safeguards 
meeting on 13 December 2007, the IAEA informed 
STUK about the implementation of integrated 
safeguards in Finland. Integrated safeguards 
include traditional nuclear safeguards as per 
INFCIRC/193, and safeguards activities in accord-
ance with the Additional Protocol, fitted together. 
While this should not lead to an increase in inspec-
tions, it should enable the IAEA to assure itself of 
the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a 
state. In practice the number of IAEA inspections 
is expected to decrease. however, the IAEA will 
perform 1–3 unannounced inspections per year in 
a state that has a number and type of nuclear in-
stallations that resembles the situation in Finland. 
The IAEA’s integrated nuclear safeguards are ex-
pected to enter into force in Finland sometime dur-
ing 2008.
STUK organised information meetings on the 
effects of integrated safeguards for the nuclear 
power plant operators, at the Loviisa NPP on 28 
September 2007 and at the Olkiluoto NPP on 25 
October 2007.
3.3 Safeguards development focussed 
on the IAEA-European Commission-
EU Member State relationship
In the international nuclear safeguards develop-
ment fora, one major topic during the year 2007 
were the roles, responsibilities and practices of the 
three levels of safeguards in place within the EU: 
those of the IAEA, the European Commission and 
the EU Member States. Discussions resumed in 
constructive atmosphere, with the objective to en-
hance cooperation and improve (cost-) efficiency. It 
appears that a state nuclear safeguards system is 
more highly valued than ever.
In 2007 STUK participated in the European 
Safeguards Research and Development 
Association’s (ESARDA) working groups, especially 
the Integrated Safeguards Working Group (IS WG). 
STUK contributed to the 29th Annual Meeting of 
ESARDA in Aix-en-Provence with three presenta-
tions, two posters and other contributions. STUK 
participated in the ESARDA Executive Board 
meetings in 2007 and STUK’s representative start-
ed her term as the Vice-President of ESARDA at 
the beginning of 2007.
During 2007 STUK’s expert participated in 
the work of the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) 
of the Council of the European Union and con-
tributed to the Safeguards Experts meetings or-
ganised by Germany in Bonn on 14 February 
and by the Commission in Luxembourg, 12–13 
September. STUK’s expert also contributed to the 
AQG-meetings where nuclear safeguards matters 
were on the agenda.
STUK sent an expert to the meeting of repre-
sentatives of nuclear operators on “Implementing 
Euratom Treaty Safeguards” organised by the 
Commission in Luxembourg, 23–24 October 2007.
STUK contributed to the work of IAEA’s Standing 
Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation 
(SAGSI) in 2007 through the participation of one 
expert as a member of this group.
STUK’s expert participated in the IAEA’s 
International SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) mis-
sion in Ukraine in November 2007.
In 2007, the group of experts for Application of 
Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
met in Mol, Belgium. There were three partici-
pants from Finland, two from STUK and one from 
Posiva.
3.4 Bilateral cooperation and 
peer-to-peer exchanges 
strengthen regional security
Finland’s cooperation programmes in the area of 
non-proliferation are directed towards our neigh-
bouring countries outside the EU and are moti-
vated by the continued need for enhancement of 
the regional security environment. Accordingly, 
STUK continued its cooperation programme with 
the Russian Federation in 2007. The focus in 2007 
was on the cooperation with the Russian nucle-
ar security and safeguards authorities, mainly 
through peer-to-peer exchanges. Collaboration with 
24
STUK-B 88
Ukraine in search for mutually beneficial areas for 
future cooperation led to an agreement about a 
programme for the next 2–3 years and tasks for 
the 2008 programme. The total annual budget al-
located to these cooperation programmes is now 
200 000 euros.
3.4.1 The Russian Federation is 
extending safeguards to non-
nuclear radioactive materials
The cooperation programme with the Russian 
Federation to date has covered the review of six 
regulations, dealing for example with the qual-
ity assurance of some fuel cycle activities and the 
accountancy and control of radioactive materials 
and waste. The regulations reveal a change in the 
role of the authority of the Russian administration: 
they are required to put out the requirements for 
the industry to comply with and to audit and in-
spect the performance to ensure compliance. Thus, 
the administrative philosophy is in transforma-
tion from instruction oriented to performance ori-
ented. The challenge is unprecedented, namely to 
maintain the strength of the instructive inspec-
tion discipline and complement that with system 
audits. Long term peer support is considered very 
beneficial.
The new Russian regulation in the area of con-
trol of radioactive materials other than nuclear 
represents something unique in the world. The 
principles and practices of nuclear material ac-
countancy are to be applied in this area in a practi-
cal way. The required effort has already been ac-
complished at the nuclear power plants. The major 
challenge now is to establish the initial inventories 
in all areas of national economy. Peer support is 
again desired. It is expected that technical, ex-
pert and financial support will be required by the 
Russian Federation to accomplish this effort with a 
credible outcome.
The spent fuel measurement device (SFAT) 
programme did not proceed further during 2007. 
The demonstration and delivery of the complete 
product to Rostechnadzor is planned to take place 
in the autumn of 2008.
A joint training course for the Finnish and 
Russian Customs Authorities was organised in 
April 2007. There were 24 participants from sever-
al Customs points in both countries. The first part 
of the course included lectures at STUK and excur-
sions to the helsinki port, to the Vainikkala rail-
way border crossing station and to the Vaalimaa 
highway border crossing station, which handles 
cars and trucks. The second part of the course, 
which focussed on technical details and practical 
exercises, was conducted at St. Petersburg Customs 
Academy and at the St. Petersburg seaport. The 
good experiences from this course warrant expect-
ing that a similar bilateral training and learning 
exercise will take place in 2008. Representatives 
of the IAEA participated as course observers and 
they gave also lectures. It was considered that the 
course elements may well fit to IAEA’s Material 
Security Programme’s deliverables.
A new regional border control event, which 
would be organized within the Baltic Sea States 
co-operation framework, was discussed in July 
2007 with the Russian Customs Authority and the 
IAEA.
3.4.2 The programme with Ukraine 
is in the definitions phase
In 2007 cooperation with Ukraine was limited to 
support in implementing the Additional Protocol 
obligations and in determining the programme for 
the future and in defining tasks to be implement-
ed in 2008. The programme’s perspective for the 
next 2–3 year period includes activities and tasks 
in the following areas: assessment of regulatory 
documents in the area of nuclear safeguards and 
nuclear material security, including physical pro-
tection; specification of ways and technical means 
which will enable reliable and efficient monitoring 
and investigation of incidents involving nuclear 
or other radioactive materials or waste (mobile 
laboratory); support of the development of nuclear 
material fuel verification capacity of the Ukraine 
national nuclear safeguards system, particularly 
for spent fuel; information technology support for 
building inspector capacity in the areas of nuclear 
safeguards and security, including physical protec-
tion; coordinated support for establishment of a 
functional web-based information portal (Infoatom) 
for the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine.
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3.5 Nuclear security activities rely on 
cooperation between authorities
3.5.1 National border control developments to 
counter illicit trafficking are in progress
During 2007 STUK was involved in the planning 
of the radiation detection system for the new sea-
port of helsinki, which is under construction at 
Vuosaari. While the implementation of radiation 
monitoring at borders is fully under the jurisdic-
tion of the Finnish Customs, STUK’s role is to 
provide expert advice, particularly on the detec-
tion concept and equipment specifications. This is a 
part of the long and successful history of the coop-
eration between STUK and the Finnish Customs. 
STUK also provided conceptual guidance to the 
Customs on their comprehensive plan for the ongo-
ing maintenance and development of the Finnish 
border monitoring system.
Cooperation regarding the Customs officers’ 
training in radiation detection is covered in chap-
ter 3.4.
3.5.2 International nuclear security 
meetings are on the increase
Successful nuclear security, along with the whole 
field of nuclear safeguards, relies heavily on inter-
national cooperation. One sign of its apparent im-
portance is the number of international meetings 
held on these topics. STUK’s Nuclear Materials 
Section participated in a few of those meetings in 
2007:
•	 CBRN Conference, the Netherlands, November 
2007
•	 IAEA International Conference on Illicit Nu-
clear Trafficking: Collective Experience and the 
Way Forward, Edinburgh, November 2007
•	 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Interdic-
tion Exercise “Eastern Shield 2007”, Odessa, 
October 2007 (participation as observer)
•	 ITWG (International Technical Working Group 
on Combating Illicit Trafficking) 12th Annual 
Meeting, Umeå, June 2007
•	 EU 2nd Radiological Risk Reduction Seminar, 
Brussels, June 2007
•	 Workshop: Multi-country project on combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear material, Karlsruhe, 
April 2007
•	 Europol 3rd Seminar on Trafficking of Radiologi-
cal and Nuclear Materials, the hague, March 
2007.
There appears to be a widely shared general view 
of illicit trafficking and malicious acts that involve 
nuclear or radiological materials. The internation-
al nuclear security community considers that the 
threat remains real, while the probability of a ma-
jor incident is perceived as low. Presently there 
are international conventions and resolutions in 
sufficient numbers and scope, the implementation 
of which, on the other hand, could benefit from 
stepping up. In the past years implementation of 
technical detection methods has greatly advanced. 
This development could steer the next detection ef-
forts towards standardisation and networking. At 
the same time, prevention and response continue 
to merit our vigilant attention.
3.5.3 The national unofficial 
network of security authorities 
held its third meeting
STUK convened a meeting of Finnish authorities 
involved in various fields of nuclear security in 
September 2007. The meeting was the third of its 
kind and as the previous two, included a round-
table briefing into the current nuclear and radio-
logical security matters of each participating or-
ganisation. Another topic for the meeting was to 
address further development of the procedures for 
first responders in an acute radiological incident.
3.5.4 One incidental recovery related 
to nuclear materials
In 2007 there was one detection related to illicit 
trafficking – an incidental recovery – that involved 
nuclear materials in Finland. A piece of depleted 
uranium arrived to Finland among a shipment of 
recycled metal. This was detected at the port of 
entry. STUK was notified and the object was de-
livered to STUK headquarters where it was taken 
into nuclear material accountancy.
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3.6 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.6.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2007 The Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO), which is a policy making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), FiNDC can provide technical expertise to 
the CTBTO, while also attending to the Finnish 
national interests.
3.6.2 The analysis pipeline has become 
a well established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
International Monitoring System’s network (IMS). 
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The IMS network 
is still developing, and the number of operational 
stations was about 50 at the end of 2007 (in the 
final stage there will be 80). The operational sta-
tions generated approximately 600 spectra per day 
for the FiNDC analysis pipeline to handle. The 
analysis pipeline is linked to the LINSSI database 
and equipped with an automated alarm system, to 
enable efficient and fully automated screening of 
the data.
3.6.3 Noble gas measurements 
are gaining momentum
The nuclear test by North Korea (DPRK) in 2006 
provided valuable insight into the importance of 
noble gas (xenon) monitoring for the verification 
system. This has inspired worldwide accelerated 
development of the xenon monitoring capabilities 
of the IMS network. Also the FiNDC has respond-
ed to this challenge: in 2007 the FiNDC devel-
oped a prototype version of the “bgpeaks” analysis 
software. This software is capable of both batch 
and interactive analysis of 3D beta-gamma coin-
cidence spectra. In 2007 the FiNDC also installed 
the “Aatami” software in its automated pipeline. 
Aatami has been developed at the CTBTO for 
analysis of xenon gamma spectra by high-resolu-
tion germanium (hPGe) detectors. As a result the 
FiNDC now performs fully automated analysis of 
all xenon spectral data generated at IMS stations 
in a beta-test mode.
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4 Conclusions
4.1 Nuclear safeguards: what 
matters most is well
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspec-
tion activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate 
that the Finnish licence holders take good care 
of their nuclear materials. There were no indica-
tions of undeclared materials or activities and the 
inspected materials and activities were in accord-
ance with the licence holders’ declarations. STUK 
remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two 
licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for 
them to correct their reporting and to update the 
descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA 
nor the European Commission made any remarks 
nor did they present any required actions based on 
their inspections. By their nuclear materials ac-
countancy and control systems, all license holders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under 
the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation.
In 2007 STUK performed 27 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
10 at the Loviisa NPP and 17 at the Olkiluoto NPP. 
The Commission took part in 20 and the IAEA in 
21 inspections. STUK performed 5 NDA measure-
ment campaigns, 2 at the Loviisa NPP and 3 at the 
Olkiluoto NPP. At other facilities, STUK performed 
5 safeguards inspections, of which the Commission 
and the IAEA took part in 4. At Onkalo, STUK 
performed 4 safeguards inspections, of which the 
Euratom took part in 1 and the IAEA in 2 inspec-
tions. The IAEA and the Commission made a 
technical visit to Onkalo, accompanied by STUK 
and hosted by Posiva. The IAEA carried out com-
plementary accesses at University of Jyväskylä 
and Metso Materials Technology in Tampere. IAEA 
sent its safeguards statements to the Commission, 
which amended them with its own conclusions and 
forwarded them to STUK. The conclusions by the 
Commission were in line with the IAEA remarks 
as well as STUK’s findings; there were no out-
standing questions by the IAEA or the Commission 
at the end of 2007. Inspections and inspection per-
son days of STUK, the IAEA and the Commission 
in 2007 are presented in Table 5 (Appendix 2). The 
progress of inspection amounts and inspection 
person days from 2002 to 2007 are presented in 
Figures 8 and 9.
One of the very few abnormal radiation detec-
tions in Finland in 2007 involved nuclear material: 
a piece of depleted uranium was recovered in an 
incoming shipment of recycled metal at the port of 
entry. The object was delivered to STUK and taken 
into nuclear material accountancy.
4.2 Transport of radioactive 
materials: awareness promotion 
a theme for the near future
In the field of transport of non-nuclear radioac-
tive material in 2007, several defects and faults 
were detected in the safety licensees’ transport 
procedures. Based on these indications, STUK con-
cluded that there is a lack of knowledge regarding 
the transport regulations among the safety licen-
sees. It was also at times evident that the safety 
requirements for transport were not perceived as 
particularly important, as the safety licensees did 
not emphasise them in their work. When encoun-
tering a lack of knowledge or interest, STUK took 
steps to increase the awareness of transport safety 
and security and to strengthen good safety culture. 
Close cooperation with the safety licensees and 
promotion of safety culture will continue also in 
the future.
In the field of nuclear material transport, safety 
culture is a definitive leading principle. In 2007 
STUK concluded that in the transport of nuclear 
material the transport plans approved by STUK 
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were followed and that the transports were car-
ried out in accordance with the Finnish legislation. 
Thus far the number of on-site inspections has 
been very low, and in the future STUK aims to in-
crease this effort.
4.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty: awaiting 
Entry into Force
2007 was a difficult year for activities related to 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). The international political climate in 
the field of test-ban related non-proliferation was 
harsh and the Provisional Technical Secretariat 
(PTS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was straining under 
budget constraints, due to outstanding financial 
contributions from some major state signatories. 
however, by sacrificing work in other areas, the 
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Figure 8. The number of inspections from 2002 to 2007.
Person days used in safeguards inspections on site 2002–2007
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
IAEA
COM
STUK
Figure 9. Inspection person days from 2002 to 2007.
PTS was able to continue the development of the 
International Monitoring System. Going into 2008, 
the outlook seems to be brightening somewhat, and 
the next few years might be of paramount impor-
tance for the future of the CTBT.
A major goal of all current CTBT related ac-
tivities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
To reach this goal, major steps have to be taken in 
the political arena, and an important prerequisite 
for positive political action is that the verification 
system of the CTBTO is functioning and able to 
provide assurance to all parties that it is impossi-
ble to make a clandestine nuclear test without get-
ting detected. FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the verification system 
has already demonstrated its potential for detect-
ing nuclear tests.
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6 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement con-
cerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radio-
logical and nuclear (such as 
in “protective measures taken 
against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK
Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment ac-
cording to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross 
gamma and neutron detec-
tion
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
high-enriched uranium
HPGe
high-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
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INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materi-
als
LEU
Low-enriched uranium
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEEC
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
Onkalo
Underground rock character-
isation facility (for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory to 
the CTBT hosted by STUK 
(FIL07)
SAGSI
Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation
SFA
Spent Fuel Assembly
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SKI
Swedish Nuclear Power 
Inspectorate
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
STUK
Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
TVO
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj
U
Uranium
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table 1. Summary of nuclear materials receipts and shipments in 2007.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 114 20 179 –
W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 60 10 158 –
W0L2 (2/2) Sweden 58 9 818 –
W0LS W0L1 41 6 788 58
W0LS W0L1 41 6 786 59
W0LS W0L1 41 6 786 58
W0LS W0L2 41 6 895 62
W0LS W0L2 41 6 893 62
W0LS W0L2 41 6 893 62
WL0V Spain 111 13 940 –
WL0V Russian Federation 108 12 945 – 
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium, Pu = plutonium.  
 Note: W0L1 and W0L2 shipments are marked only once into the table as W0LS receipts.
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2007
Table 2. Numbers of fuel assemblies at 31 December 2007.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 4 410/3 565 510 970 4 281
W0L1 1 095/523 186 894 762
W0L2 1 137/567 191 143 845
W0LS 5 658/5 658 960 786 7 983
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor)
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Table 3. Amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2007.
MBA natural U (kg) LEU/HEU (kg) DU (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
WL0V – 510 970 – 4 281 –
W0L1 – 186 894 – a) 762 –
W0L2 – 191 143 – 845 –
W0LS – 960 786 – 7 983 –
WRRF 1 511 60.1 0.002 – –
WFRS 44.7 1.4 857.0 0.003 2.5
WKK0 2 419 – – – –
WHEL 40.4 0.3 20 0.003 2.5
Minor holders < 0.2 0.00116 931 < 0.01 0.134
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals, WHEL =  Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the 
University of Helsinki, U = uranium, LEU =low-enriched uranium, HEU = high-enriched uranium, DU = depleted uranium.
a) TVO has ca. 10.3 kg DU samples for training and exhibition purposes at the Olkiluoto NPP.
Table 4. Amounts of nuclear material at the minor nuclear material holders.
Company
Nuclear material (kg)
MBA + use of NMDU nat. U LEU HEU Pu Th
Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) – – – 0.00116 – – SF 0293 CA, Minor NM activities
Finnair Engineering 45.5 – – – – – SF 0302 CA, DU radiation shielding
Rautaruukki, Raahe Works 231 – – – – – SF 0303 CA, DU radiation shielding
Inspecta 321.4 – – – – – SF 0304 CA, DU radiation shielding
Outokumpu Stainless* 0 – – – – – W0KU, DU radiation shielding
Centre for Technical Training, Metal 
and Machinery
15.5 – – – – – SF 0336 CA, DU radiation shielding
Polartest 152.6 – – – – – SF 0339 CA. DU radiation shielding
MAP Medical Technologies 165 – – – – – SF 0325 CA, DU radiation shielding
Metorex International – 0.01955 – – – – SF 0337 CA, U-nat standards
University of Jyväskylä, Department 
of Physics
– 0.0044 – ~0 ~0 ~0.134 WDPJ, Basic research
DU = depleted uranium, Nat. U = natural uranium, LEU = low-enriched uranium, HEU = high-enriched uranium,  
Pu = plutonium, Th = thorium, MBA = material balance area, NM = nuclear material.  
*In 2007, Outokumpu Stainless sent all their DU shieldings (3 pieces) to Thermo Electron (Erlangen) GmbH, Germany  
and informed the Commission and STUK that they have finished all activities with NM.
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APPENDIX 2 IAEA, European Commission and STUK 
safeguards field activities in Finland in 2007
Table 5. IAEA, Commission and STUK safeguards inspections on site.
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V 6 March Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 7 March Routine inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 8–9 March Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
W0LS 3–5 April STUK SFAT (+ES) 0 0 1 0 0 6
WL0V 12–13 April STUK SFAT (+ES) 0 0 1 0 0 4
TVO HQ 26 April International NM transfers 0 0 1 0 0 1
ONKALO 9 May Technical visit, IAEA/COM participated 1 1 1 1 1 2
W0L1 12 May OL1 PIV 1 1 1 1 1 2
WL0V 29 May Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2 30–31 May OL2 PIV + OL1 post-PIV 2 2 2 2 2 2
WDPJ 6 June CA (exempted NM) 1 1 1 2 1 1
WRRF 11 June PIV 1 1 1 1 1 2
W0L2, W0LS 13 June OL2 post-PIV +KPA routine 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L1 19–21 June STUK GBUV (+ES) 0 0 1 0 0 9
WRRF 26 June Extra 0 0 1 0 0 2
ONKALO 29 June Routine inspection  (IAEA/COM/SKI observers) (1) (1) 1 (2) (2) 2
WL0V 16 August Fuel followers identification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 21–22 August Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 25 August Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 26 August LO1 core verification 1 0 1 1 0 1
WL0V 15 Sep. LO2 core verification + PIV 1 0 1 1 0 1
WL0V 25–26 Sep. post-PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
Metso Materials 
Technology, 
Tampere
27 Sep. CA, Finland invited IAEA 1 0 1 2 0 2
WKK0 28 Sep. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WHEL 16 Oct. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WFRS 17 Oct. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vaalimaa-WL0V 23 Oct. NM Transport inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0LS 5–7 Nov. STUK SFAT 0 0 1 0 0 6
WL0V 8–9 Nov. STUK eFORK 0 0 1 0 0 4
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 12–13 Nov. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
ONKALO 14 Nov.
System inspection  
+ routine inspection  
(IAEA, SKB observers)
(1) 0 1 (1) 0 2
WL0V 15 Nov. Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 30 26 40 33 27 72
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CA = Complementary Access,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 The staff of STUK’s Nuclear Materials 
Section and Director of Department of Nuclear 
Waste and Materials Regulation and his Deputy
Table 6. The staff of STUK Nuclear Materials Section and Director of Department of Nuclear Waste and Materials 
Regulation and his Deputy. All section staff participate in the core safeguards tasks. Additionally, each person has 
some special areas of expertise to focus on.
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Inspection coordination, handbooks, Additional Protocol implementation
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector Non-destructive assay, FINSP to the IAEA safeguards
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards of research and development, final disposal
Mr. Jaakko Tikkinen Senior Inspector Advisor, transport and nuclear security
Ms. Paula Karhu Inspector Nuclear security, environmental sampling, internal audit
Ms. Anna Lahkola Inspector Transport of nuclear materials, central accountancy
Ms. Milka Holopainen Inspector Transport of radioactive materials, international inspectors
Mr. Antero Kuusi Assistant Inspector Data bases, non-destructive assay
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, non-destructive assay, 
environmental sampling
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Secretary
Figure 10: Staff of Nuclear Materials Section.
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APPENDIX 4 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2007 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005.
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 set-
ting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports of dual use items and technology as 
amended.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
STUK-B 88
37
12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
